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Education  is  a  customer-input-technology  (Rothschild  and  White,  1995).  The  educational 
performance of a student depends on the characteristics and behaviour of his fellow students. 
Hence it is not irrelevant for a single student with whom he or she is studying. Furthermore, 
the selection of students into different types of school is a policy topic in many countries. One 
of the biggest obstacles for a reasonable debate about selection policies is the measurement of 
peer effects which puzzles statisticians and econometricians for quite a while. This paper 
approaches  the  measurement  problem  from  a  different  point  of  view.  It  documents  an 
experimental learning environment which identifies “clean” peer effects and offers insight 
into the optimal composition of learning groups. 
Economists and educational researchers put great effort into the identification of this optimal 
composition. The selection of students according to perceived ability into different tracks is a 
controversial  topic  in  many  countries.  Its  efficiency  is  disputed  and  it  has  distributional 
consequences (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006). The identification refers to two empirical 
problems: Who provides the most external effects in learning groups and who can reap the 
greatest benefits from them? This approach to peer effects differs from the one provided by 
Falk and Ichino (2006). These authors find experimental evidence for positive peer effects in 
a  “real  task”  production  environment.  In  their  case  the  peer  effect  stems  from  the  mere 
presence of another person in the room. They relate their approach to the “social facilitation 
paradigm”, a research topic in the psychological literature (e.g., Zajonc, 1965, Cottrell et al., 
1968, or more recently Feinberg and Aiello, 2006).  The experiment in this paper goes one 
step beyond this. The subjects can interact and discuss the problems, thus helping each other 
in the preparation for a final performance measurement. 
In  the  economic  literature,  high  ability  students  are  typically  assumed  to  provide  more 
beneficial  external  effects  than  low  ability  students.  A  popular  measure  for  such  an 
assumption is average ability in a class (e.g. in Epple & Romano, 2003). The measure implies 
that high ability students can also benefit more strongly from better peer effects because their 
marginal productivity is greater. Such a pattern suggests that homogeneous learning groups 
are efficient. Students should be sorted according to ability. However, if low ability students 
benefit more strongly from high ability students then heterogeneous groups are the dominant 
solution.  A  similar  argument  can  be  made  if  low  ability  students  provide  the  positive 
externality. Table 1 summarizes the optimal group composition. Table 1: Providers and beneficiaries of peer effects with implications for tracking policies. 
(Higher) benefits from peer effects  Direction  of  peer  effects 
and optimal policies  High Ability  Low ability 
High 
ability 
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As stated above, the properties of peer effects in many theoretical contributions imply that 
selection is efficient, but international studies do not show that selective systems perform 
better.  These  results  question  the  way  peer  effects  are  modelled,  although  they  do  not 
contradict them necessarily (see Maier, 2004, de Fraja and Landeras, 2006, Eisenkopf, 2007). 
The objective of this paper is to provide and discuss evidence on three research questions: 
1.  Do peer effects exist? 
2.  Who provides peer effects, who benefits from the effects? 
The results of question 2 lead to implications to the more fundamental question which was 
addressed above: 
3.  What  is  the  optimal  composition  of  learning  groups?  Should  policy  makers  track 
students according to ability and/or some other measure? 
Econometricians  face  several  problems  when  estimating  peer  effects,  the  most  important 
methodological  discussion  of  them  is  provided  by  Manski  (1993).  Nevertheless  a  large 
literature  has  been  devoted  to  getting  around  them  (e.g.  Hoxby,  2000,  McEwan,  2003, 
Hanushek et al., 2003, Cullen, Jacob and Levitt, 2003, these and others are summarized in 
Ammermüller and Pischke, 2006). I will sketch three of them at this moment. Firstly, most 
measures are endogenous. Take average performance of fellow class members as an example. 
If  positive  peer  effects  exist,  the  performance  of  any  student  should  improve  with  the 
performance of his class members. However, the left hand variable has an impact on the peer 
effect  measure,  as  any  observed  student  also  has  an  impact  on  his  fellow  students.  This 
problem could be ignored if an independent ability measure for any student was available 
which lacks in many datasets. 
Secondly, students are not randomly assigned to their peer groups. Parents, schools or any 
other party decide where students enrol. Such a selection process precludes the identification of a counterfactual. How would a student have performed in a different peer group or as a 
single learner? 
Thirdly, teacher behaviour and other environmental characteristics can change with the peer 
group composition. The same teacher may teach the same topic in a different way, if the 
average ability or the ability distribution changes in a class. Arguably, such an effect is part of 
a peer effect. One could distinguish between a  direct peer effect, where students directly 
influence each other, and an indirect one, where students influence each other via the teacher. 
The focus in this paper is on the direct peer effect. Most of the theoretical literature also 
focuses on the direct peer effect and ignores the indirect one. The exception by Meier (2004) 
proves the rule. 
Obviously,  a  single  experiment  cannot  represent  an  entire  educational  process  or  make 
econometric  analysis  meaningless.  However,  the  experiment  documented  in  this  paper 
measures  peer  effects  without  any  of  the  discussed  econometric  problems.  It  has  an 
independent ability measure, assigns peers randomly and includes no teachers at  all. The 
drawbacks of the chosen experimental approach become obvious and will be discussed at the 
end of the paper. Most critical objections can be met with the help of further experiments and 
the design of this experiment provides a methodological battle horse for future replications, 
specifications, and refinements. To my best knowledge, this paper provides the first truly 
experimental approach in the economic literature which measures peer effects in a learning 
environment.  
In the experiment described in this paper the participants learned solution strategies for a 
logical puzzle either alone or with a partner. The results show the existence of a positive peer 
effect. Two results stand out with respect to optimal group composition. Firstly, only high 
ability students benefit from increasing ability of the partner. Secondly, subjects who are 
member in a club (e.g. sports team or orchestra) provide a positive effect for non associated 
subjects (i.e. those who are not in a club). The performance of club members is independent 
of the membership status of their partners. 
This  is  not  the  first  paper  which  identifies  peer  effects  in  an  educational  context  with 
randomized assignments of the observed individuals to different groups. Sacerdote (2001) 
estimates peer effects with data from Dartmouth College where students where randomly 
assigned to different dorms. The data do not allow an identification of the actual mechanisms 
how peer effects work and the effects may be caused by changes in local arrangements during 
the observation period.  I will describe the experiment in the following section. The results with respect to the research 
questions are presented in section 3. Section 4 concludes with a summary and discussion of 
the results 
 
2  The Experiment 
The objective of the experiment was to provide evidence on the existence and properties of 
peer effects in learning processes. To identify a learning process a task was chosen in which 
the  subject  could  improve  themselves  within  reasonable  time.  A  logical  puzzle  called 
Kakurasu was chosen. A detailed description of the puzzle can be found in the appendix and 
at www.janko.at (in German). The correct boxes in the following matrix have to be marked: 
Figure 1: Exemplary Kakurasu puzzle 
  5  6  1  2   
3          1 
7          2 
1          3 
2          4 
  1  2  3  4   
Each box in the matrix has two values depending on its column and row (see numbers below 
and on the right hand side). The sum of the marked boxes has to add up to the values on the 
top  (row  values)  and  the  left  hand  side  (column  values).  Figure  2  provides  the  correct 
solution. 
Figure 2: Solution for the example 
  5  6  1  2   
3      X    1 
7  X  X    X  2 
1  X        3 
2    X      4 
  1  2  3  4   
 
The students got the rule in written form but no hints how to solve the puzzles. A first test 
with a set of these puzzles measured how much the students did understand. 4x4 matrices as 
used in Figures 1 and 2 were used for this test. The test score of this test serves as an ability measure in the analysis. After this test the students could prepare for a final test. In this 
preparation period the experimental treatment took place. In the single treatment group the 
subjects prepared alone. In the pair treatment group they could cooperate with a partner. A 
final test concluded the learning process. This final test contained 5x5 matrices. All subjects 
had to solve it alone. The number of correctly solved puzzles provides the test score in both 
cases. Questionnaires collecting data on control variables were handed out at the beginning 
and the end of the experiment. All tests and questionnaires are documented in the appendix. 
 
Figure 3: The design of the experiment 
 
The first experiment was conducted on December the 5
th in 2006 with 85 Swiss students 
which we recruited at a high school (Kantonsschule) in Kreuzlingen in the canton of Thurgau 
in Switzerland. The students applied with their name and their class level and got 20 Swiss 
Franks (about 12.40   or 16.25 US$) for their participation. A replication is scheduled for 
February at a similar school in the same canton.  
The  experiment  was  conducted  with  students  from  the  Kantonsschule  Kreuzlingen 
(Switzerland) in the classrooms of that school. 29 participants were assigned to the single 
treatment and 56 to the pair treatment group. The subjects were assigned randomly to the 
different groups. Each subject in the pair treatment group got a randomly assigned partner, 
though only from the same class level and sex. Due to missing partners, two pairs were 
formed with subjects from different class level. Table 2 shows the composition of single 
treatment and pair treatment groups. All subjects did the experiment at the same time to 
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naire capacity constraints the subjects did the experiment in five different rooms. Two rooms were 
filled with single learners, three rooms (including a large one) with the pair treatment group. 
Since the differences across rooms within a specific treatment group are insignificant, it is 
assumed that differences in rooms do not matter between the treatment groups, too.  
The student received their instructions in oral and written form from the author of this paper. 
In each room an overseer was in charge of the technical details. These overseers received 
instructions about the procedure of the experiment but not the puzzle. The participants were 
explicitly told that the overseer could not answer questions with respect to the puzzle.  
 
Table 2: The distribution of the subjects into single treatment and pair treatment groups 
  Single treatment group  Pair treatment group 
Classlevel  Male  Female  Sum  Male  Female  Sum 
Level 2  6  5  11  11  17  28 
Level 3  4  6  10  5  11  16 
Level 4  6  2  8  4  8  12 
Sum  16  13  29  20  36  56 
 
3  Results 
3.1  The Existence of Peer Effects 
The descriptive statistics show (significant) differences between single treatment group and 
pair treatment group in the second test score (label: secondtest). The results in the first test 
(firsttest) also differ, but not significantly. Further research may reveal if this difference is 
caused  by  the  fact  that  the  participants  knew  at  the  beginning  of  the  first  test  about  the 
enrolment in the pair treatment and about their prospective partner. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Single treatment  Pair treatment   
Mean  St.dev  Mean  St.dev 
secondtest (5x5 matrices)  2.069  1.981  3.125  2.001 
firsttest (4x4 matrices)  3.207  3.109  4.018  2.526 
 Negative binomial regressions show the treatment effect, i.e. the existence of peer effects 
(Table 4). Learning with a partner provides a benefit even if one controls for differences in the 
first test and heterogeneity in class levels and sex. Count data like in our case the number of 
correctly solved puzzles require either negative binomial or Poisson regressions, depending 
on  the  dispersion  of  the  counted  measures.  Throughout  the  paper,  only  the  results  from 
negative binomial regressions are reported. The results from the different approaches do not 
differ very much anyway.  
The first test score is a good ability measure since it is a highly significant predictor of the 
final test score. A great number of control variables have been collected, e.g. performance in 
school, marks in math, membership in clubs, etc. The subjects could also evaluate how they 
liked the partner, the assigned task, the cooperation and much more. Only one of them was 
significant, club membership (Club), i.e. if the subject was member in any type of club like a 
sports team or an orchestra. Controlling for club membership of the subjects implies that the 
treatment effect is significant only on a 10% level. The share of club members was much 
greater in the pair treatment group and club membership somehow boosts performance. The 
club membership issue will be addressed in greater detail later in the paper. 
 
Table 4: Estimation of the Peer or Treatment Effect  
Negative binomial regression; N =85, Indep.Var: Secondtest; coefficients (St.err) 
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Pseudo R   .0149  .1678  .1717  .0254  .1923 
Significance levels: ***=.001,**=.01,*=.05, ^=0.1 
 The treatment effect differs with the subsamples. Only male subjects (Table 5) and students 
from higher class levels (3
rd and 4
th level, Table 6) benefit from a partner. The peer effect 
among men may be explained by results from Gneezy, and Rustichini (2004) who find that 
men, but not women perform much better in competitions than if acting alone.  In this case, 
working together in the preparation induces competition. 
 
Table 5: Estimation of the Treatment Effect, separate for men and women 
NBReg; Male subjects; N = 36  NBReg; Female subjects; N = 49 
Treatment  .487* (.215)  Treatment  .177 (.211) 
Firsttest  .173*** (.040)  Firsttest  .208*** (.035) 
Constant  -.060 (.266)  Constant  -.043 (.258) 
Pseudo R   .1803  Pseudo R   .1637 
 
Table 6 : Estimation of the Treatment Effect, separate for younger and older subjects 
NBReg; Class level 2; N = 39  NBReg; Class level 3 & 4; N = 46 
Treatment  .131 (.241)  Treatment  .504** (.192) 
Firsttest  .118** (.0385)  Firsttest  .262*** (.038) 
Constant  .334 (.256)  Constant  -.516 (.279) 
Pseudo R   .0712  Pseudo R   .2623 
 
3.2  Providers of and Beneficiaries of Peer Effects 
The literature about peer effects typically focuses on the ability of learning partners. The score 
in the first test provides the ability measure in this experiment. Of course, the analysis is 
restricted to those 56 subjects who studied with a partner. Again club membership is the only 
significant  control  variable  and  remains  in  the  analysis.  Table  5  documents  the  results. 
Regarding the whole sample the ability of the partner does not have a significant impact on 
the performance of a subject. However, the impact of a good partner depends on the subject 
itself. Only good subjects (who solved four or more puzzles in the first test) benefit from an 
increasing ability of the partner. The negative coefficient for low ability students becomes 
even significant if club membership as a control variable is dropped.  Table 7: The impact of the partner’s ability on performance in the second test 
Negative binomial regression, Independent Variable: Secondtest; coefficients (robust St.err)  
  N = 56  Firsttest<4; N=23  Firsttest 4; N=33 
Partnerscore (firsttest of partner)  .022 (.022)  -.110 (.068)  .057* (.022) 
Firsttest  .171*** (.027)  .152 (.120)  .173*** (.031) 
Club  .378* (.146)  .343 (.282)  .340* (.145) 
Constant  -.009 (.201)  .536 (.356)  -.131 (.249) 
Pseudo R   .1644  .0890  .1041 
Significance levels: ***=.001,**=.01,*=.05, ^=0.1 
 
However, promoters of “soft skills” trainings claim that the benefits of cooperation do not 
depend  only  on  the  ability  of  the  partners  but  on  some  sort  of  social  competence.  The 
membership in a club suggests that a subject has more experience in interaction with others 
than  a  non-associated  subject.  Hence,  the  next  analysis  focuses  on  the  impact  of  club 
membership  of  a  subject  and  his  partner  on  performance  in  the  second  test.  I repeat  the 
analysis from above and control also for club membership of the learning partner. Table 6 
documents the results. In general, the club membership of a partner does not provide a benefit 
for  a  subject.  But  an  asymmetric  effect  exists  again.  For  club  members  (Club  =  1)  the 
membership of the partner does not matter. However, non-associated subjects (Club = 0) 
benefit from learning together with a club member. The sample size for this analysis is quite 
small but the effect is still highly significant. Table 8: The impact of club membership on performance in the second test 
Nbreg, Independent Variable: Secondtest; coefficients (robust St.err)  
  N = 56  Club = 0, N = 19 Club = 1, N = 37 
firsttest  .168*** (.027)  .155*** (.054)  .168*** (.029) 
Clubpeer 
(membership of partner) 
.089 (.109)  .850*** (.202)  -.065 (.118) 
Club  .385** (.142)     
Constant  .029 (.188)  -.512* (.255)  .513** (.189) 
Pseudo R   .1634  .1569  .1351 
 
4  Summary and Discussion of the Results 
This first experiment has shown that peer effects in learning exist. Furthermore it revealed 
that, for the given task and difficulty, good students benefit from increasing ability of their 
partners. Club members provide a positive effect for subjects who are not in a club.  
The  third  and  most fundamental  research  question  was  about  the  optimal  composition  of 
learning groups. The existence of peer effects suggests that single learners, e.g. in cases of 
home-schooling,  face  some  deficits  which  have  to  be  compensated  elsewhere.  There  is 
evidence that selecting learning groups according to ability increases the efficiency level (see 
also Table 1 and the related discussion in the introduction). Yet this argument is qualified by 
the club membership issue. Club members perform on average better but they produce  a 
positive effect for their non-associated partners. This evidence supports rather comprehensive 
education. 
One should be reluctant to read too much into a single experiment. I will discuss some caveats 
and how further research can meet them. 
-  The sample size is fairly small. A replication of the study at another Swiss school 
is in preparation at the moment. 
-  The  experiment  captures  only  one  specific  learning  process.  The  results  may 
change with the type, workload and difficulty of the problem. 
-  Following  Lazear (2001),  the  peer  effect  and  the  optimal  composition  of  peer 
groups changes with the number of persons in a group.  
-  Almost all subjects knew their learning partner. Though personal appreciations of 
the partner (liking the partner, being close friends, enjoying the cooperation) did not influence the final performance a replication with unknown learning partners 
may bring different results. I conducted a pre-test for this experiment with first-
year students during the introductory week at the University of Konstanz. Most of 
these students did not know each other. The results indicated a peer effect even in 
this setting. 
-  The payout does not depend on the performance and students have no incentive to 
perform  well.  The  experiment  can  be  replicated  easily  with  variable  payouts 
though the observation of subjects during the experiment suggests that students 
were  motivated  anyway.  By  the  way,  the  same  critique  applies  to  educational 
achievement studies like PISA or TIMSS. 
In general, the external validity of any single experiment seems questionable. What does 
the experiment actually reveal about education and policy tools? Peer groups are larger 
and more complex in schools, as it is the case with the problems the students have to 
solve. However, most of the critical issues can be addressed in further experiments and 
most available data on actual peer groups in education precisely imply the econometric 
problems discussed in the introduction: endogeneity, the lack of reliable counterfactual, 
and the unobserved change in behaviour by a third party. 
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